Restoring a Fish Stock: A Dynamic Bankruptcy Problem

Total Allowable Catch (TAC) regulating schemes have been introduced in most fisheries. TAC distribution following the Proportional Rule, based on historical catches, implies that harvesters or vessel groups which have captured more in the past and contributed to overfishing are getting larger quotas than groups that have contributed less to overfishing. In contrast to this rule a more egalitarian rule, the Constrained Equal Award Rule, is proposed for distributing the TAC. Contingent upon the fishing techniques used by the harvesters, it is demonstrated how the fish stock recovery period, harvest and profitability may vary according to these two rules.

The stability of the roommate problem revisited

The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be a step towards furthering our understanding of matching market performance. We propose absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate problems with strict preferences. This solution, which always exists, either gives the matchings in the core or predicts other matchings when the core is empty. Furthermore, it satisfies the interesting property of outer stability. We also determine the matchings in absorbing sets and find that in the case of multiple absorbing sets a similar structure is shared by all.roommate problem, core, absorbing sets

BANKRUPTCY OF FISHING RESOURCES: THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN ANGLERFISH FISHERY

Since 1983 the Northern European anglerfish fishery, exploited by fleets of seven countries, has been regulated using a policy of Total Allowable Catch (TAC). In this paper, the strategy followed by the European Union (EU) in distributing the established TAC among the seven countries is explored. It is inferred that the EU has utilized a weighted proportional rule, taking the average catches for the period l973–78 as the reference point. On the other hand, given that the fishery situation for the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 can be characterized as a bankruptcy problem, this paper also explores, as possible means of enriching the Common European Fishery policy, alternatives to this rule. This work proposes the application of two additional rules derived from game theory, the nucleolus and the Shapley value, and studies their properties. The analysis suggests that it may be worth considering not only the proportional distribution, but also the alternative rules.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Efficient Structure of Provision for Emergency Public Services

We consider an economy in which a central government has to decide on the provision and location of an emergency public service the quality of which diminishes with distance. The emergency service has to attend a group of municipalities geographically located in a star-tree-graph. We derive the optimal location and provision, as well as the Lindahl prices for the emergency service. Also, we determine the minimum quality of service that makes efficient the existence of a unique provider for the whole economy. Conversely given any level of quality of service we identify the stable and efficient structure of provision.

Solidarity to achieve stability

Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability

Egalitarian solutions in the core

In this paper we define the Lorenz stable set, a subset of the core consisting of the allocations that are not Lorenz dominated by any other allocation of the core. We introduce the leximin stable allocation, which is derived from the application of the Rawlsian criterion on the core. We also define and axiomatize the egalitarian core, a set of core allocations for which no transfer from a rich player to a poor player is possible without violating the core restrictions. We find an inclusive relation of the leximin stable allocation and of the Lorenz stable set into the egalitarian core.balanced games · reduced game properties Rawls and Lorenz criteria

Restoring a Fish Stock: A Dynamic Bankruptcy Problem

Total Allowable Catch (TAC)-regulating schemes have been introduced in most fisheries. TAC distribution following the Proportional Rule, based on historical catches, implies that harvesters or vessel groups that have captured more in the past and contributed to overfishing are getting larger quotas than groups that have contributed less to overfishing. In contrast to this rule, a more egalitarian rule, the Constrained Equal Award Rule, is proposed for distributing the TAC. Contingent upon the fishing techniques used by the harvesters, it is demonstrated how the fish-stock recovery period, harvest, and profitability may vary according to these two rules.